The Second Phase of the Regime Change Operation in Syria

The October 7 attacks have already been a sharp turning point in the history of the Middle East. First, Palestine was targeted. Then, Hezbollah was made to pay a hefty price in Lebanon. And now, another ally of Iran, Syria, is in danger of falling into the hands of jihadists. After Syria, the possibility of the Netanyahu-Trump alliance attacking Iran looms on the horizon. The coalition that Iran calls the “axis of resistance” in the Middle East is being dismantled. While we are on the topic, let us say right away that the implicit (!) AKP-Israel alliance of interests in Syria is pretty apparent. Assad is being punished severely, the Aleppo and Idlib are becoming the AKP’s backyard as a new “Talibanistan” and the pressure on the Kurds is intensifying.

The second phase of the project to overthrow Assad and establish an Islamist government in Syria began with the unexpectedly easy victories of the jihadists.The Syrian Army, which managed to hold on to the eastern half of Aleppo and the military bases in the region even during the most devastating years of the Syrian civil war, has now retreated in disarray to the south, reaching as far as Hama, without putting up any resistance during this offensive. The regions that were taken from the jihadists at great cost were handed over to the Islamists almost without firing a single shot. The looming threat of ethnic cleansing, and even genocide, for millions of Alawites and Christians has become a grave and undeniable possibility. Hostility toward the national achievements of the Syrian Kurds has gained traction, while the likelihood of Trump making concessions to Erdoğan in the areas east of the Euphrates River remains a significant concern.

The primary factor behind the jihadists' swift victory is undoubtedly the Israel-U.S. alliance. Israel, by compelling Hezbollah forces and Iraqi Shiite militias to divert their focus away from supporting the weakened Syrian Army, has effectively set the stage for the jihadists' success. It has become evident that the jihadists, led by HTS, who have been planning this operation for months, possess far superior material resources, intelligence capabilities, and motivation compared to the Syrian Army.

A Short Note on HTS

Who is the main force of the attack, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), formerly known as the Nusra Front? HTS was formed in 2011 under the name of the Nusra Front, directly affiliated with Al Qaeda. The order for the formation was given by the ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi himself. The directive for the group's formation was issued by ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi himself. Although these details are now being suppressed, we will continue to highlight them. Subsequently, the Nusra Front split from ISIS, leading to violent clashes between the two organizations that claimed thousands of lives. The leader of the Nusra Front, Jolani, took a pragmatic approach and separated from Al Qaeda to get rid of the image of a terrorist organization and had to take a new name. In short, this is HTS, an off-shoot of ISIS. The fact that HTS, which is on the terrorist organization lists of Turkey and the US, is actually heavily supported by these very powers is a clear representation of imperialist hypocrisy.

The second force involved in the offensive that led to the fall of Aleppo is the former Free Syrian Army (FSA), now rebranded as the Syrian National Army (SNA), which operates under the patronage of Turkey's ruling AKP. It is widely known that the SNA's primary objective is to dismantle the national achievements of the Syrian Kurds.

In addition, other jihadist networks, such as the Islamic Army, have established themselves in Aleppo. In the future, conflicts among these groups may intensify, potentially leading to a new civil war, this time between Islamist factions. It is unlikely that HTS will tolerate other factions sharing power within its expanded emirate. However, fractures within HTS's various branches are a distinct possibility. This volatile environment could also provide an opportunity for ISIS to resurge. Such dynamics are reminiscent of the early stages of the Syrian Civil War and the prelude to conflict in Afghanistan.

The Course of the War Will Be Clear Soon

The trajectory of the war is expected to become evident in the coming days, or even hours, as the situation unfolds. The key question is whether the Syrian Army will mount any resistance in the northern Hama region. Early reports indicate that a defensive line has been established there; however, the jihadists have not yet launched a full-scale offensive in that direction. If the Syrian Army can hold its ground and build a strong defense, it may prolong the civil war. As the conflict endures, Russia and Iran are likely to solidify their presence on the Syrian battlefield, uniting their efforts to support Assad's regime. Even China may be more likely to join in the Syrian equation. There are reports that Iraqi Shiite militias have entered Syria in small groups, protected from Israeli and US airstrikes. Conversely, it is evident that a force consisting of merely hundreds of fighters cannot alter the balance of power on its own. Although Hezbollah has suffered significant setbacks, it may return to Syria once its clashes with Israel diminish. Additionally, the extent to which the Syrian Army can organize civilian volunteer militias will be a crucial factor in the military balance. From this point forward, Syria's fate will be shaped by the answers to these two questions:

Will the Syrian Army be able to mount a substantial defense and resist on the Hama front and along the Mediterranean coast?

Will the AKP, which exerts significant influence over the jihadists, pressure HTS to remain restrained, wary of provoking Russia and the risk of HTS spiraling out of control? Or will it seize the opportunity to advance its ambitions, symbolized by the aspiration to pray in the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus, under the pretense of caution and moderation?

At present, these issues remain unresolved, as the jihadists are focused on consolidating their gains in and around Aleppo. In other words, it will become clear within the next day or two at most whether an offensive will be launched toward Hama and Latakia. Similarly, if such an offensive begins, the resistance capability of the Syrian Army will come into focus. Should the Syrian Army lack the capacity to resist, the possibility for diplomacy will effectively vanish, and Assad's regime will likely collapse.

Furthermore, it is anticipated that the jihadists may shift their focus eastward to sever the connection between Syria and Iraq, aiming to capture strategic cities such as Palmyra. This would effectively cut off the Iraqi support line, which is already under constant attack by Israeli and U.S. airstrikes. Recent reports indicate that U.S. aircraft are bombing Iranian-backed militias along the Syria-Iraq border. In essence, the growing alignment between HTS, the U.S., and the AKP has become increasingly evident.

The Situation in Rojava

Another critical dimension of the issue is the situation in Rojava. The AKP government is pursuing its agenda of conquest driven not only by sectarian motives but also by a strong anti-Kurdish stance. Negative sentiments within Turkey toward jihadism and jihadists are being mitigated through the strategic use of the "Kurdish threat" as a political tool. Nationalist and chauvinistic sentiments are being inflamed, with the AKP-MHP base appeased by narratives of conquest.

On the ground, the situation remains precarious. Due to the U.S. policy of non-intervention west of the Euphrates, YPG units around Aleppo have become vulnerable targets. Reports indicate that the YPG may be compelled to retreat from two Kurdish neighborhoods in Aleppo after their supply lines were severed. Thus far, the YPG has already withdrawn from the Tel Rifaat district and surrounding Kurdish villages in northern Aleppo.

The last point under YPG control west of the Euphrates is the important city of Manbij. The Syrian National Army (SNA), which is directly under the control of the MİT (Turkish Intelligencia), is expected to attack Manbij, which has a population of 100 thousand. We will see whether or not there will be clashes in Manbij, and how intense they will be. The US should not be expected to defend the YPG in Manbij, which is located west of the Euphrates. On the other hand, while the SNA's threats to the east of the Euphrates continue, it does not seem likely that this region will be attacked without permission from the US. The AKP, whose proxy forces have captured Aleppo and its surroundings, has become enormously powerful in the Syrian field. They will wait for Trump's term to begin for the east of the Euphrates and try to strengthen their trump cards until then.

The Catastrophic Situation of the Syrian, Iranian, and Russian Front

For those who saw the logic behind the changing balance of power in the Middle East, the course of the war in Lebanon, and the development of the war in general, it was clear that a major move was being prepared in Syria. In other words, in the simplest terms, it was not necessary to be an experienced intelligence expert working in the field to see how large gaps Hezbollah’s withdrawal from Syria would create in Syrian defense lines and make these areas vulnerable to attack. Indeed, the number of Israeli attacks and threats against Syria had been increasing for months. But it is clear that the Syrian-Russian-Iranian front could not sense this obvious danger. We have seen how Russia made obvious miscalculations in Ukraine.

In Syria, Russia has also made significant miscalculations, including competing with Iran and, at times, sidelining it altogether. Similarly, it has become apparent that Iran underestimated the military, political, and intelligence dynamics of the regional war that erupted after October 7.

The Assad regime, burdened by its hollow bourgeois structure, has failed to inspire societal mobilization, organize new combat-ready military units, or instill motivation among its people. This is despite the fact that substantial segments of the population harbor deep-seated hatred for the jihadists. Civil wars, however, are profoundly influenced by political and class dynamics, and the Assad regime has struggled to leverage these factors to its advantage.

The bourgeois structure of the Assad regime is far from organizing the necessary dynamism, determination, and sacrificial spirit in the people. When the economic crisis, the cutoff of foreign aid, bad management, and corruption are added to this, the Syrian Army has shattered at the moment of attack, let alone sensing the jihadist threat. There may be many other examples that can be given, but think about it, you have Iran, which is an accomplished drone manufacturer, and Russia, which uses them intensively in Ukraine; but the Syrian Army has also remained completely pedestrian in the field of drones. On the contrary, it is HTS that has adapted to drone wars. We see a Syria-Iran-Russia axis that does not even have the intelligence that tens of thousands of jihadists are preparing for an attack.  The jihadists led by HTS are very well equipped, their intelligence is very strong, and they have access to high-tech weapons. Moreover, while it is always easier to defend in such wars, it has become clear that the Syrian Army does not even have enough soldiers to hold the positions.

Attitudes of Turkey, Israel and the US Towards Regime Change

In his assessment in 2020, James Jeffrey, the US Special Representative for Syria at the time, made the following assessments for HTS: “They are direct extensions of Al Qaeda, they are considered a terrorist organization, but they are primarily focused on fighting the Assad regime at the moment. We have not yet accepted these claims, but they claim to be patriotic opposition fighters, not terrorists. We have not seen them pose an international threat for some time.” As can be seen in the example, the US always embraces useful jihadists. 

They are also happy that the recent Aleppo offensive weakened Russia and Iran. On the other hand, the question of “how domesticated has HTS become” brings up the danger of a possible HTS Sharia state. Let alone completely overthrowing the Assad regime, even seizing the vast resources in Aleppo and its surroundings would mean enormous human resources, military resources, and economic opportunities for HTS. Although the functioning of all these resources is primarily dependent on its powerful northern neighbor Turkey, “will HTS be able to hold on to its power” or “who will it start doing business with?” These may be problematic issues for the US and Turkey. What will be done if millions of Alawites and Christians take refuge in Lebanon in a desperate attempt to survive? We should not expect the state of Israel, which is fed by war, to be afraid of an Islamist regime in Syria; it is already known that Salafi Islamists and Israel are on good terms. However, Syria falling largely under Turkish control may not be a very pleasant scenario for the US and Israel.

The situation presents both opportunities and risks for the AKP. The straightforward aspect lies in obstructing the Kurds. However, the complex challenge involves determining how far Turkey, as the patron of HTS, is willing to go. Will the AKP be able to distance itself from HTS when necessary? Can it pursue its current strategy without fully antagonizing Russia? What actions can be taken if the HTS leadership collapses, ISIS resurges, or new waves of refugees emerge in the event of a renewed civil war?

These uncertainties and risks highlight the potential diplomatic logic of allowing Assad to remain in power, even in a significantly weakened state. HTS, restricted to Aleppo and Idlib, might also be viewed as a more manageable force for Ankara in comparison to alternative scenarios

Conclusion

The AKP has hindered Syria's recovery by supporting extreme religious fanatics. Now, the prospect of a Taliban-like regime taking control of Syria looms on the horizon. This development is likely to have adverse repercussions for democratic rights within Turkey itself. It is important to remember that a strong and effective leftist opposition in Turkey could serve as a check on the AKP's aggressive foreign policy.

Recent events have underscored a critical reality: survival in a volatile region like the Middle East is not possible without robust organization and strategic preparedness.